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[So

:r. No. 18081.

In Bank. May 18, 1951.]

HOMER A. NORRIS et aI., Respondents, v. SAN MATEO
COUNTY TITLE COMPANY (a Corporation), Defendant; EMIL J. RIBARSKY et aI., Appellants.
[1] Judgments-Res Judicata.-A judgment which has become

final is conclusive as to the rights of the parties on the issues
litigated. (Code Civ. Proc., §l908.)
[2] Vendor and Purchaser-Recovery by Vendor of Purchase
JllIoney.-Where title to a down payment held by a title company was not adjudicated in a prior action between the parties
to a real estate transaction in which it was determined that
McK. Dig. References: [1] Judgments, § 395; [2,4,5] Vendor
and Purchaser, § 297; [3] Escrows, § 10; [6J Vendol' and Purchuu,
1306.
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Bone of the parties was entitled to recover from any of the
others, whoever had title to the down payment at the time of
the prior action is entitled to recover it from the title company.
Escrows - Performance of Conditions. - Under the standard
form of escrow instructions, which provide for the exchange
of money and a deed on stipulated conditions, the vendee retains title to the money until the conditions have been performed.
Vendor and Purchaser-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase
MoneY.-Where a down payment under a contract for purchase
of realty is not deposited in escrow by the vcndef!s pursuant
to escrow instructions, but is paid to the vendors' ag"l:nts pursuant to a deposit receipt as the initial payment to the vendors
in performance of the contract, title to such payment vests in
the vendors when they accept the contract.
Id.-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase Money.-Where title to
a down payment under a contract for purchase of realty :'1
vested in the vendors, and any right to recover the excess of
the down payment over the damages caused by the vendceli
breach is foreclosed by a previous judgment, the vendors may
retain the entire down payment.
Id.-RecovelJ by Vendor of Purchase Money-Judgment.-In
an action to recover a down payment made by the vendees in
a real estate transaction and deposited with a title company,
a personal judgment against the vendees is erroneous where the
right of the vendors to recover anything from the vendees has
been foreclosed by a previous judgment.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San
Mateo County and from an order granting a summary judgment. Edmund Scott, Judge. Modified and affirmed.
Action for money had and received. Summary judgment
for plaintiffs modified and affirmed.
P. H. McCarthy, Jr., F. Nason O'Hara and Herbert So
Johnson for Appellants.
Norman S. Menifee for Respondents.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs brought this action against the
San Mateo County Title Company and defendants Ribarsky
to recover a $2,000 down payment made by the Ribarskys
under a contract for the purchase of real property from plain[3] See 10 Oal.Jur. 589; 19 Am.Jur. 426.
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tiffs Norris. The down payment was paid to plaintiffs Keeler
and Chance, the Norriscs' agents in negotiating the sale of
the property. The agents deposited the down payment with
the escrow holder, San Mateo County Title Company. The
trial court entered summary judgment for plaintiffs based on
the affidavit of plaintiff Chance and the judgment roll of a
prcvious action between the parties. It was stipulated that
the trial court could consider the judgment roll in ruling
upon the motion for summary judgment. Defendants Ribarsky have appealed.
The affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment avers the following facts: Defendants Ribarsky signed
a deposit receipt in which they agreed to purchase the property for $20,000. They paid $2,000 down and agreed to pay
the balance within 45 days. Plaintiffb Norris accepted the
contract and agreed to pay plaintiffs Keeler and Chance a
5 per cent commission, or in the event of default, one half
the down payment. The deposit receipt provided that "In
case said purchaser shall fail to pay the remainder of said
purchase price or complete said purchase as herein provided,
the amounts paid hereon shall, at the option of the Seller be
retained as liquidated damages." Plaintiff Chance deposited
the down payment I with the San Mateo County Title Company,
pursuant to authorization of defendants Ribarsky, together
with a deed "duly executed by plaintiffs NORRIS and escrow
in!'ltructions in conformity with the aforesaid deposit receipt
duly executed by plaintiffs NORRIS." Plaintiffs Norris complied with all the terms and conditions of the deposit receipt,
but defendants Ribarsky refused to make any further payment
under the contract. The affidavit concludes "That said sum
of Two-Thousand Dollars ($2,000.00) remains and is on deposit with defendant SAN MATEO COUNTY TITLE COMPANY;
that plaintiffs NORRIS are entitled to the whole of said sum,
. . . and that plaintiffs KEELER and CHANCE . . . are entitled
to be paid one-half (%) of said sum."
Defendant Emil J. Ribarsky filed an affidavit in opposition
to the motion for summary judgment averring the following
facts: Defendants were induced to make the down payment
under the terms of the deposit receipt by the promise of plaintiffs Keeler and Chance to sen property owned by defendants.
By this sale of their own property, defendants intended to
secure the funds necessary to perform their contract with the
Norrises. Plaintiffs Keeler and Chance did not, however,
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effect a sale of defendants' property, and as a result of their
failure to perform their promise, defendants were damaged
in the sum of $2,000.
It appears from the judgment roll in the previous action
that after the Ribarskys' refusal to perform their contract,
plaintiffs Norris brought an action for damages for breach
of contract. The Ribarskys filed a cross-complaint against
the Norrises and Keeler and Chance. They alleged that they
had been induced to enter into the contract as a result of
fraudulent promises by Keeler and Chance that they would
sell property owned by the Ribarskys to enable the latter to
purchase the Norris property. They further alleged that it
was understood that the contract between the Norrises and
Ribarskys would be void if Keeler and Chance were unable to
sell the Ribarsky property, and that the down payment would
then be refunded to the Ribarskys. The cross-complaint also
pleaded a cause of action against Keeler and Chance for
breach of contract to sell the Ribarsky property. ,/
The trial court in the previous action entered judgment for
defendants Ribarsky on the complaint for damages for '
breach of contract on the ground that plaintiffs failed to prove
that they suffered any damage as a result of the breach. It
entered judgment against the Ribarskys and in favor of the
Norrises and Keeler and Chance on the cross-complaint, based
on findings that the allegations with respect to the collateral
agreement to sell the Ribarsky property were not true. The
judgment failed to make any disposition of the $2,000 that
had been deposited with the San Mateo County Title Company.
[1] It is clear from the judgment in the previous action
that plaintiffs Norris have no right to recover damages from
defendants for breach of contract, and that defendants have
no right to damages against plaintiffs Keeler and Chance and
no right to restitution against plaintiffs Norris. The rights
of all the parties were put in issue and litigated. The judgment entered, having become final, conclusively establishes
that none of the parties is entitled to any recovery against
any of the others. (Sutphin v. Speik, 15 Ca1.2d 195, 201-203
[99 P.2d 652, 101 P.2d 497] ; Bernhard v. Bank of America,
19 Ca1.2d 807, 813 [122 P .2d 892] ; Code Civ. Proc., § 1908.)
[2] The previous judgment did not adjudicate the title
to the $2,000 down payment held by the San Mateo County
Title Company. Since it did determine, however, that none
of the parties was entitle<.l to 1'pcover from any of the others,
it is clear that whoever had title to the deposit at the time of
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the previous action still retains that title and may recover
the money from the title company.
[3] Under the standard form of escrow instructions, which
provide for the exchange of money and a deed upon stipulated conditions, the vendee retains title to the money until
the conditions have been performed. (H~"ldebrand v. Beck,
196 Cal. 141, 145-146 [236 P. 301, 39 A.L.R. 1076) ; Kellogg
v. Ourry, 101 Cal.App.2d 856, 859 [226 P.2d 381); Hastings v. Bank of America, 79 Cal.App.2d 627, 629 [180 P.2d
358].) [4] In the present ease, however, the down payment was not deposited in escrow by the vendees pursuant to
escrow instructions. It was paid to the vendors' agents pursuant to the deposit receipt as the initial payment to the vendors
in performance of the contract, and title to it vested in the
vendors when they accepted the contract. (Tuso v. Green,
194 Cal. 574, 583 [229 P. 327); Kellogg v. Ourry, 101 Cal.
App.2d 856, 860 [226 P.2d 381]; Landfield v. Oohen, 89
Cal.App.2d 177, 179 [200 P.2d 149].) [5] Since any right
the vendees may have had to recover the excess of the down
payment over the damages caused by their breach is foreclosed by the previous judgment, the vendors may retain the
entire down payment.
[6] t The summary judgment is erroneous, however, in
awarding plaintiffs a personal judgment against defendants
Ribarsky for $2,000. Just as the previous judgment foreclosed
any right of the Ribarskys to recover from the plaintiffs, it
also foreclosed any right of plaintiffs to recover from them.
The judgment must accordingly be modified to provide that
plaintiffs recover from the San Mateo County Title Company
the sum of $2,000 and that defendants Ribarsky have no right,
title or interest in said sum held by the San Mateo County
Title Company. As so modified the judgment is affirmed.
Each side is to bear its own costs on this appeal.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.
Appellants' petition for a rehearing was denied June 14,
1951.
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